A regulatory adjustment process for optimal pricing by multiproduct monopoly firms by Vogelsang, Ingo & Finsinger, Jörg
A REGULATORY ADJUSTMENT PROCESS FOR OPTIMAL
PRICING BY MULTIPRODUCT MONOPOLY FIRMS
by
Ingo Vogelsang and Jrg Finsinger
MIT Energy Laboratory
Working Paper No. MIT-EL 78-020WP
(Revised) August 1978
A Regulatory Adjustment Process for Optimal Pricing
by Multiproduct Monopoly Firms
by
Ingo Vogelsang and Jrg Finsinger*
ABSTRACT
This paper describes an incentive mechanism that is shown to enforce the
use of Ramsey prices by multiproduct monopolies. The constraint given is
simple. It limits information requirements on the regulatory agency to
bookkeeping data of the firm. Its implementation could be easily
controlled by outside courts or auditors. The process, therefore, makes
use of invisible hand properties shifting the workload of welfare
optimization from the regulatory agency to the regulated firm. This may
lead to the ironical conclusion that regulatory commissions should fire
their economists. It, however, becomes both profitable and socially
beneficial for the regulated firms to employ them.
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21. INTRODUCTION
Following a survey by Baumol and Bradford (1970) of the by now classical
literature on second-best pricing for public enterprises a series of
articles has focused on this topic. Conditions for prices to achieve a
constrained welfare maximum are well-known. They are named after Ramsey,
who first (1927) derived them as the solution to an optimal taxation
problem. Welfare maximizing firms should inflate all demand elasticities
for their products by a common factor and otherwise behave like an
unconstrained monopolist (Dreze and Marchand, 1975).
However, there remains the task of translating this rule into an
incentive scheme for the firms so that it becomes operational for the
firm management and the regulators. This question has been raised but
left open by Bawa and Sibley (1975) within the scheme of rate-of-return
regulation.
If regulators had to decide on efficient price structures, they would
have to know demand elasticities and cost functions within some range of
the current prevailing prices and current costs. In general, the firm's
staff and managers will know price elasticities and cost functions for
their products better than do regulators. Hence, the firm management may
be in a superior position to calculate and implement welfare maximizing
prices. But why should they? We see three basic reasons for them to do
so. First, they may hold a professional1 or humanitarian interest in
pursuing a welfare-maximizing strategy. This cannot generally be
3expected from managers, and may even be an undesirable feature of
somebody running an enterprise. Second, the survival of the firm may be
in danger because of potential competition by newcomers.
Welfare-maximizing prices can then be a limit-pricing strategy in the
sense that they are best sustainable.2 The empirical significance of
this hypothesis remains largely unexplored. Third, the regulatory agency
could try to force the firm to convey the necessary information or to
compute welfare-maximizing prices. But without duplicating company
management and staff, how could the regulators evaluate the information
they receive? Even the firm is not sure of its demands and costs.
Discrepancies between ex post figures and projections previously filed
with a regulatory agency are not necessarily evidence of cheating. The
solution of this problem could be a well-defined rule that motivates
firms to charge economically efficient prices.
Regulatory agencies may be excessively influenced or even corrupted by
special interest groups. For this reason, an additional advantage of a
predetermined price-setting rule is precisely that it prevents continuous
direct intervention by an agency in the price structure used by a
regulated firm.
As a first step in this direction we suggest a simple incentive mechanism
which leads firm management to improve the price structure step by step
and which, under certain conditions, results in an optimum. This is
described in Section 2.2 after Section 2.1 has outlined the concept of
4constrained welfare maximization used throughout in this paper. Sections
2.3 and 2.4, being the heart, give proof to our main proposition and the
economic rationale behind it. Then, Section 2.5 and the Conclusion turn
to the policy issues that might follow from our reasoning.
Two complications which our rule may have to face are dealt with in
Section 2.6. One is that the firm tries to pass inside the effect of the
short-term-oriented rule by using a long-term strategy. The other is
that the firm does not face decreasing ray average costs.
2. THE MODEL
2.1 Characterization of Budget-Constrained Welfare Maximization
We consider a regulated private or public enterprise in a natural
monopoly setting.
Assumption 1: (Objective of the regulatory agency) The firm's social
objective as pursued by the regulatory agency is the maximization of
welfare subject to a budget constraint:
max W(p)
s.t. (p) > 0
(p) is the firm's profit function
H(p) = x(p)p - C(x(p))
with C(x) the cost function.
Assumption 2: (Welfare function) Welfare is supposed to be given by
consumers' surplus W(p) with the following properties:
(a) W(p) is continuously differentiable and convex3
(b) grad W(p) = - x(p), where p = (pl .....pn) denotes the price
vector corresponding to the demand vector x(p) for the n commodities
produced by the firm.
6It is Assumption 2(b) which characterizes W(p) as consumers' surplus.
This is restrictive insofar as income effects are taken to be
insignificant. They could in fact play a major role, if a substantial
part of the economy were regulated in the suggested way.4 Then,
however, regulation as a market-oriented policy becomes questionable.
Profits of the regulated firm have been eliminated from the welfare
function because in the limit they will be shown to vanish. Also,
welfare effects on commodities not supplied by the regulated firm are
neglected. As long as the firm's input/output decisions do not
substantially affect prices on other markets, such welfare effects will
be small. 5
The nontrivial first order condition for an optimum with n(p) < 0 is
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Condition 1 is the generalized Ramsey formula. It is implied by the
optimal taxation result in Diamond and Mirrlees (1971, p. 262).6 An
unconstrained profit-maximizing monopolist in equilibrium would satisfy
Condition 1 with x = 1, but at a constrained second best solution x will
be just high enough to allow the firm to break even.
7Geometrically, as seen in Fig. 1, Condition 1 means that at the
optimum7, the normal to the surface p(p) = 0 I and the demand
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vector x are collinear. This result is plausible once we recall that the
normal to the isowelfare surfaces pW(p) = c is -x (Assumption 2(b)).
Hence, at the optimum the isowelfare surface is tangent to the zero
profit surface.
2.2 The Regulatory Algorithm
Assumption 3: (The firm and its markets) (a) We suppose a regulated
private or public multiproduct enterprise whose objective is to maximize
profits in each consecutive period j, jN. It faces demand and cost
functions which do not change over time. There are no intertemporal cost
effects. The firm management is assumed to know these functions.
(b) The inverse demand function p(x) shall be continuous and nonnegative
for all xR+ and lim p(x) 0.
x + 00
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8This is compatible with the assumed welfare function W(p).
(c) The profit function (p) shall have the following properties:
(1) n(p) is continuously differentiable
(2) In all neighborhoods of p with (p) = O, there exists p+
with (p+) > 0
(3) gpI (p) > 01 is a compact set.
(d) The cost function C(x) exhibits decreasing ray average costs:
VrR with r > 1 C(rx) < r(C(x))
Assumption 4: (Regulatory constraint) (a) The regulatory agency knows
only actual costs, prices, and quantities which have been realized by the
firm up to the present. The firm is required to serve all demand at
current prices. Hence the data observed by the regulatory agency at time
j is pj, resulting in
Xj = x(pj), C(xj), and (pj).
Pj is the price vector at time j.
(b) The regulatory agency defines the set of feasible prices for each
consecutive period j + 1, jN, by
Rj = pIxjp - C(xj) < 0
9Assumption 4(b) means that in period j + 1 the firm may ask for prices
which at best would produce no profit, if applied to the quantities sold
in period j. Taking quantities of period j as weights the firm on
average has to reduce its prices by the previous profit margin.
Figure 2.
In Fig. 2, the shaded area corresponds to R The firm is allowed to
maximize profit constrained by Rj. Indeed, the convergence to the
optimal point requires just that.8 In spite of managerial theories of
the firm and the satisficing literature we think it plausible that the
10
management can be induced to conform with this objective to the extent
that its income depends on profits and losses. Thus, if sufficiently
motivated by a strong profit sharing scheme, the management will try to
maximize (p) subject to Rj. Rj has been constructed by moving the
tangent hyperplane R at pj into the direction of the largest welfare
increase grad W(pj) = - xj. Now, assume the firm chooses the price
vector Pj+I in period j + 1. In terms of welfare the firm cannot do
worse than choose some point on the boundary of Rj. Then Fig. 2
suggests that W(pj+1) > W(pj). Rj can therefore be interpreted as
a linear approximation of a minimum welfare constraint. The firm thus
solves a problem quite similar to the dual of constrained welfare
maximization. There welfare is the objective and profit the constraint.
Here profit is the objective and welfare the constraint.
The procedure can be repeated at the end of period j + 1 if n(Pj+l ) is
nonnegative. It gives rise to an iterative process, which is described
by the flow chart in Figure 3.
The process can only work in the described manner, if the firm can always
find a constrained price vector, which yields nonnegative profit
ij. This condition depends on the nature of the firm's cost function.
If the firm is a natural monopoly by conventional standards, it is
fulfilled. This means that its cost function exhibits decreasing ray
average costs, i.e. r > 1 C(rx) < r C(x). Decreasing ray average costs
represent the natural extension of decreasing average costs to the
11
Figure 3, Flow Chart I.
Observe
Impose Regulation Rj:
Xjp - C(xj) < 0
Pj, Xj, 11j, C(xj(Pj))
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multiproduct firm.9 In a local context they are equivalent with the
unprofitability of marginal cost prices. In precisely this situation
Ramsey prices are relevant, for they maximize welfare under the
constraint of the financial viability of the firm.
Our aim was to arrive at a mechanism that sets a limit on the firm's
ability to influence its price level but at the same time gives it enough
freedom of choice regarding the price structure. The method employed has
some similarity with the construction of a price index. According to our
suggestion the firm should have the freedom to choose prices in such a
way that a Laspeyres price index for its products would not exceed a
constrained level. This constraint reduces the level of the base period
by at least the firm's profit margin in that period. This can be
verified by considering the constraint R:
O= xjpj - C(j) - xjP - C(xj).
Ts j x jp
Thus 1 - . Within the price level defined by this
xjp. xjp.
Laspeyres index the relative prices are allowed to vary. In the
following period we therefore expect to get new quantities giving a new
base for the index. The result is a monotonically decreasing Laspeyres
chain index.
The proposed algorithm makes explicit use of a regulatory lag. In the
literature, the benefits of such a lag have been stressed with respect to
13
lowering production costs. It has been shown that a lag can help to
reduce factor distortion caused by regulation. If a breakeven constraint
is imposed, a lag will force a profit-maximizing firm to produce at a
cost-minimizing point (Bailey, 1973). This result is also implied by our
procedure. The breakeven constraint prevents a factor distortion of the
Averch-Johnson kind to occur, because there is no asymmetric treatment of
capital and the other factors of production. During the lag period of
the process the firm is allowed to benefit from reducing its costs and
changing its price structure vis-a-vis a maximum price level. Obeying
Rj it will move into a profit-increasing direction. In this direction,
surplus must increase. At worst this additional surplus goes entirely to
the firm. But in the next period the new regulatory constraint, Rj+1,
absorbs the additional profit and hands it over to the consumers. Thus
the firm always moves into the right direction both for itself and the
public at large.
Our proposition is that the process described by Flow Chart I will
converge to a constrained welfare maximum.
2.3 Convergence of the Regulatory Algorithm
Proposition 1: Under Assumptions 2 to 4 W(pj) converges to a point W*
with the following property: there exists p such that W(p) = W*, n(p) =
O, and at p the necessary optimality Condition 1 holds.
Remark: Although the sequence W(pj) converges, the sequence of the
pj need not converge. There may be many p with W* = W(p) and (p) = 0,
between which pj may oscillate.
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Proof: Step 1: We show that nj > 0 j N. Without loss of
generality > 0 10 We denote the inverse demand function by
p(x). j N with Hj > 0, there exists r > 1 such that
p(r xj) exactly meets the regulatory constraint i.e. p(r xj)xj -
C(xj) = O. This is so, because Assumption 3(b) implies that
p(rxj)xj is a continuous function of r and approaches 0 as r gets
large. Hence the intermediate value theorem is applicable. Now, we have
p(r xj)rxj - C(r xj) > p(r xj) r xj - rC(xj = O. Clearly,
nj+1 > p(r xj) rxj - C(r xj) and thus j+l > 0. By induction
Ij > 0 holds for all j N.
Step 2: We show that W(pj) converges. By step 1 j > 0 V j N.
Fig. 2 suggests that welfare increases at each step. Indeed, we have
W(pj+i) > W(pj) + j.
To see this, note that the convexity of W(p) implies
W(pj+i) W(pj) + grad W(pj)(pj+l - pj).
But grad W(pj) = -x(pj) and also the regulatory constraint Rj can
be written as
R = /pxj p - Cj < = p xj(Pj - ) > j.
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Hence
W(pj+1) > W(pj) + j.
At each step welfare increases by at least the amount of the previous
profit. Thus, W(j) j=1 is a monotonically increasing sequence. It
is bounded by the constrained welfare optimum. Because of the continuity
of W(p) and the compactness of PI n(p) > 0 such an optimum must exist.
Hence, the limit W* = limW(pj) exists. It is clear that there are
points p with W(p) = W* and n(0) = O because 0 < lim nj < lim(Wj+ 1 -
Wj) = O. If there is only one such point, then pj -+ . Otherwise,
there exists a subsequence pjK converging to one of the p, because the
pj lie in the compact set IpIn(p) > 01.
Step 3: We show that at such a the-necessary Condition 1 holds. The
necessary condition for the constrained profit maximization of the
regulated firm is
grad n(pj) = xjj_, Aj > O.
Here xj 1 are market demands at prices Pj_ At any limit point we
have grad n('p) = x-, where x are market demands at .j, Now, also (p) =
O. Together with Assumption 2 this means that at p the three surfaces R,
P|W(p), = W (P)I , and the breakeven constraint of the welfare-maximizing
problem, plIn(p) = /, must be tangent to each other.
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This completes the proof.
We want to give an intuitively more appealing explanation to Proposition
I. First, why with decreasing ray average cost can the firm always
generate nonnegative profit under constraint R? The constraint would
allow the firm to break even at quantities xj of the previous period.
This is not in general feasible for the firm, for the demanded quantities
change with prices. But it can always exactly fulfill the constraint
with some multiple r > 1 of xj. Along this ray, average costs are
decreasing, while average prices called for by the constraint are allowed
to stay constant. Hency, there always exists some r > 1 and
corresponding prices fulfilling Rj which enable the firm to make
profit. Thus, decreasing ray average costs prevent the constraint from
overshooting.
Second, why does welfare increase in each period by at least the profit
of the last period? Here a revealed preference argument helps. The
constraint Rj has been set in such a way that the consumers in period j
could acquire the quantities they bought in period j - 1 at just j 1
less than what they actually paid during period j - 1. If, however, in
period j they choose to buy xj xj_1 they must be at least as well
off with xj as with x_ 1 .
Third, why does the necessary optimum Condition 1 hold at a point of
convergence of the algorithm? p lies on the zero profit surface.
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Otherwise profit could be increased which contradicts the limit property
of W(p). The constraint R at p is tangent to the welfare surfacelplW(p)
W() . The necessary Condition 1 means that R is tangent to the zero
profit surface. Suppose this were not so. Then, as demonstrated in
Figure 4, R intersects the set pjn(p) > O. The firm now is allowed to
charge any price to the southwest of R. Prices in the shaded area will
yield positive profit due to Property (2) of Assumption 3(d). Hence,
welfare could be increased, which contradicts the limit property of W(p).
S
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Corollary:
At each step of the algorithm, the welfare indicator S(p) = W(p) + (p)
increases. S(p) can be interpreted as the sum of the consumers' and
producers' surplus.
Proof:
From W(pj) > W(pj_l) + j-1 and from nj > 0 j s N we obtain
W(pj) + j > W(pj-l) + j-1 Q.e.d.
This Corollary shows that under Assumptions 2 to 4 constrained welfare
optimization never decreases total surplus S(p) over the unregulated
situation, in particular in comparison to the unconstrained
profit-maximizing monopolist. In case of increasing ray average cost
this result will not necessarily hold.
2.4 Characterization of the Point of Convergence
Proposition 1 establishes the convergence of the regulatory process to a
welfare level W* = W(P) such that at p the first-order optimality
Condition 1 holds. Of course, there may be many points p fulfilling
Condition 1. Some of these p represent constrained local welfare
maxima. But p need not be such a maximum.
19
Fortunately, our process does not choose p at random amongst the p
fulfilling Condition 1. In fact, we can be highly certain that p is a
constrained local welfare maximum. First, we know from Step 2 of the
proof to Proposition 1 that in each period the algorithm increases
welfare by at least the amount of the previous profit. Second, W* = W(p)
never is a local minimum. The only type of situation where W* =
W(p) is not a constrained local maximum, is shown in Figure 5. There p
fulfills the tangency Condition 1. But the constrained local welfare
maximum is at p*. Without formally introducing probability arguments, we
can see: The algorithm would only by "extreme mischief" (measure zero)
arrive at such a point. Additionally, this point may be called
unstable. A small change in the environmental conditions x() and C()
will cause the firm (and the regulatory agency to induce the firm) to
move into a welfare-increasing direction between pW(p) C , and
pi(p) O= 0. cf. Fig. 5.
Imagine that in spite of this the situation shown in Figure 5 occurs and
persists. Then in a one-consumer economy, the firm could induce the
regulatory agency to run an experiment. The firm would calculate p*
of the constrained welfare maximum from its knowledge of costs and
demand. It could then offer the consumer a choice between p and a price
vector close to p*, but profitable. If the consumer reveals to prefer
p to p, the process could continue from p. In an economy consisting of
many consumers such a choice is in general only feasible if unanimity is
assured through compensation payments. This involves both transaction
costs and free rider problems.
20
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2.5 How Does This Algorithm Differ from Conventional Regulation of Price
Structures?
Historically, under regulatory routine price structures have tended to
become rigid and/or internally subsidized. These phenomena can be
attributed to political and judicial influences on price structures.
This observation has led economists to convince regulators that such a
policy has its costs in terms of allocational efficiency. They have
hence tediously demonstrated the positive effect of explicitly
considering demand elasticities. Against this background our paper seems
ironical, as it frankly asks regulators to forget what they learned from
economists whenever conditions are sufficiently stable.1 1
The fair rate of return on capital or the balanced budget rule are
"easily" implementable regulatory measures to constrain price levels. So
far there has been no comparable indicator for efficient price
structures. The strength of the algorithm described above lies in the
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incentives it gives to the regulated firm to find the efficient price
structure itself. The firm management may, for instance, use peak-load
pricing or two-part pricing techniques. The management may split demand
into demand components at different time periods and may introduce
license fees. For such tariffs a necessary optimality condition
analogous to Condition 1 can be derived. With two-part tariffs, for
instance, x does not only contain the demands xi for good i but also
the demand xi for licensing/subscription to good i. Similarly, p does
not only contain the prices pi for good i but also the license fee pi
for good i.
Within the limits of bookkeeping and auditing, the information
requirements with respect to the regulatory agency are low. The agency
is supposed to have some general knowledge about the structure of the
regulated industry, especially whether it produces at decreasing ray
average costs. Furthermore, it has to know what has actually happened in
the past, but not the full possibility set of the firm. This contrasts
for instance with the problem solution of finding the optimal rate of
return in the Averch-Johnson model (Klevorick, 1971). Even with some
knowledge of demand elasticities and costs in the neighborhood of the
status quo of the firm, a regulatory agency can hardly hope to do better
than approximate first-order conditions. To the best of our knowledge,
all previous efforts to implement constrained welfare optimal prices have
therefore taken the first-order conditions to be sufficient. Compared to
this our procedure ensures that W(p) is no local minimum and that the
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point reached by the procedure is preferred to the status quo. Only in a
small class of cases, to which we give little empirical significance,
will the process stop short of a local welfare maximum.
The agency in our model has little discretionary power. It is, however,
obliged to control the quality of the firm's output because the firm may
want to reduce costs through hidden quality deterioration. This, of
course, is a standard regulatory issue.
2.6 Some Qualifications and Extensions
2.6.1 Myopic Management Behavior
So far we have assumed that the firm maximizes profit in every period j
subject to constraint Rj1. However, such myopic profit maximization
may deviate from the long-run interest of the management, which is to
maximize the discounted flow of future profits. Does the algorithm
converge in this case?
The convergence of the algorithm depends on the simple inequality
W(pj+1) > W(pj) + j. From this inequality it can be seen that the
convergence is not affected as long as j > 0 for all j. The process,
however, could converge to a suboptimal point, if the firm keeps profits
sufficiently low. But this would mean that in total it foregoes profits
which would be allowed and feasible. It can thus only be inferred that
the convergence rate may be slower in earlier periods and faster in later
periods compared to the rate corresponding to the myopic profit maximiza-
tion case. Management may want to produce losses for some periods in order
to recoup higher profits later. With decreasing ray average costs losses
are an indication of either strategic
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behavior or mismanagement. Thus, if losses occur, the regulatory agency
can either fire the management1 2 or keep the previous regulatory
constraint until profits turn up.
If profits occur, the regulatory constraint for the next period becomes
more binding and therefore narrows the firm's discretion for the future.
Eventually, the firm will be forced by its profits to follow the
convergence path. The higher the discount rate employed by the firm the
more it will want to make higher profits early. Thus, a high discount
rate may speed up the process.
2.6.2 Nondecreasing Ray Average Costs
Assumption 3(d), which postulates decreasing ray average cost may be
violated even in case of a natural monopoly. 1 3 Therefore, the
procedure described above should be adapted to the regulation of monopoly
firms with nondecreasing ray average costs. As is illustrated in Figs. 6
and 7 for the simple case of a one-product firm, there can be a striking
difference in applying the algorithm for a decreasing or nondecreasing
(ray) average cost firm. With decreasing (ray) average cost profits
always stay nonnegative, while with increasing (ray) average costs losses
may be inevitable. For a one-product firm profits and losses will follow
each other in a hog cycle manner. If, furthermore, the average cost
curve is absolutely steeper than the demand curve the process will
explode.
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Thus, in order to preserve the incentive structure of the algorithm and
in order to limit the informational requirements of the agency to
bookkeeping data, we insert a second loop into the algorithm. Loop II
deals with the case where the regulatory constraint was too strong. At
each iteration in loop II in Flow Chart II the regulatory constraint is
relaxed until nonnegative profit is again possible.
Proposition II
Under the assumptions 2, 3(a) - (c) and 4(a), the algorithm described in
Fig. 8 below converges as in Proposition I.
Proof:
Step 1: We show that loop II is finite. We have j-1 = 0 implies
_I' > . Hence, ' < 0 implies j_ 1 > O. But if j-1 > 0, then
there exists a neighborhood of Pj1 such that for all p U (Pj_1)
1(p) > 0. Hence, there exists n E N such that 'd > 0.
Step 2: Coming out of loop II we have xjlP j - C(xj_ 1) 
Xj lPjl - C(xj_l) by construction of the constraint. Therefore
Xj1(P j - Pj_l) < O. This means that at prices pj consumers
could have bought xj_1 cheaper than at prices Pj-i They, however,
decided to buy xj. Hence welfare must have increased: W(pj) >
W(pj_1). This means that )W(pj) j= is a monotonically increasing
26
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Figure 8 Flow Chart II
Note, we assume ll > 0.
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sequence. From here on the proof follows steps 2 and 3 of the proof of
Proposition 1 q.e.d.
The case of nondecreasing ray average cost is less straightforward than
that of decreasing ray average cost. Although the arguments of section
2.4 carry over, the number of periods necessary to come close to the
optimum may increase considerably due to loop II. Current profit is no
longer a lower bound for next period's welfare increase. Furthermore,
strategic firm behavior producing high losses in order to relax the
constraint may be attractive. On the other hand it can be hoped that the
fear of cream-skimming competition will in this case limit the firm's
discretion.
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3. CONCLUSION
The process described rests on some general principles, which are not
dependent on their regulatory application. As an equilibrium, letting
the firm maximize profits subject to constraint on the welfare level
of consumers generates an optimum. Convexity of the welfare function
permits substitution of the tangent hyperplane for the indifference
surface. Decreasing ray average costs or the mechanism of Flow Chart
II prevent overshooting. Hence we can converge to a local optimum
by raising the allowed welfare level in each step.
The regulatory algorithm can be interpreted as an incentive pricing
mechanism in the sense of Cross (1970). The regulated firm constrained
by Rj is encouraged to exploit both the potential for cost decreases
and the consumers' willingness to pay. The firm converts these into
profits. But both these advantages are turned over to the consumers in
the next period.
Our process does not differ substantially from the regulatory procedure
which outside inflation periods traditionally has been used in the United
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States. Here the rate level is set by applying a rate of return
constraint on past cost and quantity data of the regulated monopoly
firm. In theory, regulated firms are free then to adjust the rate
structure subject to the proof that they stay within the overall rate of
return constraint again based on past data. In practice, however, they
meet many obstacles in doing so. Due to issues of discrimination rate
structures show some inherent rigidity. As a policy recommendation this
paper hence suggests that once the rate level has been established the
actual freedom of the firms to alter their rate structure on
profit-maximizing grounds should be increased. Basically the argument
used for this recommendation is similar to the one in favor of a
regulatory lag.
Enforcement of the regulatory constraint R developed in this paper
could be supervised by auditing. Hence, its application could be
prescribed to regulatory agencies by law. Once they have accepted the
philosophy behind this approach regulatory agencies could go back to
using their beloved concept of historic costs.
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Appendix
Let the direct utility function of an individual be given by U(x, p, M) =
U(x) - px + M where M represents income (wealth) and U(x) represents the
willingness to pay for x. We want to show the convexity of the
corresponding indirect utility function V(p, M) = U(x(p), p, M) i.e.
V Ox <A 1
V(xP1 + (1 - x)(P2) xV(Pl) + (1 -x)V(p 2) (1)
First, observe that
U(x, P1 , M) < U(X(P 1 ), Pl, M) (2)
and
U(x, P2, M) < U(x(P2), P2, M) (3)
for any and in particular for x = x(xpl + (1 - x)P2). Multiply (2)
and (3) by x and (1 - x), respectively. Then, addition yields
A
U(x) - (xPl + (1 - )p2) + M
<A[ U(X(P1) ) - PlX(Pl)]
+ (1 - ) [U(x(P2) - P2x(P2) + M
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Rewriting this inequality in terms of V(p, M) yields (1).
Since W(p) is the sum of the individual indirect utility functions V(p,
M), W(p) must be convex.
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Footnotes
1. A professional interest in finding optimal price structures and in
proving that they can be implemented may be assumed at the
Electricite de France under the leadership of Boiteux who first
solved the problem of constrained welfare optimization for public
firms.
2. For this see Baumol, Bailey, and Willig (1977), or Panzar and Willig
(1977).
3. The convexity assumption (a) follows from a revealed preference
argument and the assumed absence of income effects. This argument we
owe to C.C. von Weizsdcker. It is given in the appendix.
4. The degree of approximation of more general welfare measures by
consumer's surplus is given by Willig (1976).
5. See Finsinger (1978).
6. Diamond and Mirrlees use a much less restrictive framework. See
also Baumol and Bradford (1970).
7. For simplicity corner solutions meaning zero prices are ignored here
and throughout.
8. For a qualification see 2.6 below.
9. See Baumol, Bailey, and Willig (1977), Panzar and Willig (1977), or
Baumol (1977) for a discussion of the concept with the view of
sustainability of public utility prices.
10. By not constraining the firm in the first period the regulatory
agency can always induce the firm to start the process with profits.
11. We owe the basis of this point to an anonymous referee. The
sustainability argument can lead to the same kind of policy
conclusion. Indeed, in Germany peak-load pricing some decades ago
was introduced by high-cost electric utilities threatened by
competitive pressure and takeovers.
12. In the context of U.S. regulation the agency can threaten to
withdraw the firm's license.
13. Panzar and Willig (1977) show that subadditivity of the cost
function does not imply decreasing ray average cost.
